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Abstract        
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) contain numerous nodes that their main goals are to monitor and 
control environments. Also, sensor nodes distribute based on network usage. One of the most 
significant issues in this type of network is the energy consumption of sensor nodes. In fixed-sink 
networks, nodes which are near the sink act as an interface to transfer data of other nodes to sink. This 
causes the energy consumption of sensors reduces rapidly. Therefore, the lifetime of the network 
declines. Sensor nodes owing to their weaknesses are susceptible to several threats, one of which is 
Denial of Sleep Attack (DoSA) threating WSN. Hence, the DoSA attack refers to the energy loss in 
these nodes by maintaining the nodes from entering energy-saving and sleep mode. In this paper, a 
hybrid approach is proposed based on mobile sink, firefly algorithm based on leach, and Hopefield 
Neural Network (WSN-FAHN). Thus, mobile sink is applied to both improve energy consumption and 
increase network lifetime. Firefly algorithm is proposed to cluster nodes and authenticate in two levels 
to prevent from DoSA. In addition, Hopefield Neural Network detects the direction route of the sink 
movement to send data of CH. Furthermore, here WSN-FAHN technique is assessed through wide 
simulations performed in the NS-2 environment. The WSN-FAHN procedure superiority is 
demonstrated by simulation outcomes in comparison with contemporary schemes based on 
performance metrics like Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), average throughput, detection ratio, and 
network lifetime while decreasing the average residual energy. 
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1 Introduction 
WSN includes a set of self-guiding sensors monitoring the circumstances like sound, pressure, 
vibration, and temperature. The energy for the WSN’s sensor nodes is supplied by batteries. However, 
energy loss is one of the main problems in WSN [1] that is resultant from overhearing, collisions, 
listening, idle, control packet overhead. The energy loss in the collision loss is introduced by the data 
packets’ collision in the wireless medium. The radios maintenance presents the energy loss in the 
overhearing loss in the receiving mode over data packet transmission. A radio of the node in just 
monitoring the channel creates the idle listening loss. As the control packets should be received by all 
the nodes in the transmission range, it leads to introducing the control packet overhead. In general, the 
WSN is susceptible to two kinds of attacks as invasive and non-invasive attacks. The power, timing of 
the channel, and the frequency are affected by the non-invasive, however, information transmission, 
service availability, and routing process are influenced by the invasive attacks. Among the WSN attacks, 
the service or the system is made inaccessible by DoSA [2]. The DoSA is one of the WSNs’ power 
exhausting attacks as a special Denial-of-Service (DoS) trying to maintain the sensor nodes awake to 
use further energy of the controlled power supply. In addition, the energy consumption of the sensors 
increases in DoSA attack by preventing the sensor from sleeping [3, 4]. The attacker node can transfer 
dummy data packets to authorized nodes, which causes an unnecessary transmission as well as 
increasing the energy consumption. It also processes the data obtained from the attacker nodes if the 
receiver sensor cannot detect the source when receiving data packets. Therefore, the energy consumption 
extremely increases in processing procedures and the sensors run out of energy. 
    In recent years, researchers have studied how to use mobile sink in networks. The use of mobile 
sink in networks causes the distance between nodes from the sink reduces. The reduction of the distance 
makes the energy consumption decreases. Therefore, the lifetime of the network increases. Applying 
hierarchical algorithm on networks is a proper way to improve energy consumption (decrease energy 
consumption) [5-7]. Thus, in this paper, we examine the movement of the sink in hierarchical networks 
which consist of some clusters. Each cluster consists of some typical nodes that receive needed data and 
forward them to CH. Proposed method has four phases. Clusters are made with fire-leach algorithm 
based on leach protocol in first phase. In second phase, data of each cluster is sent to determined CH 
after authentication at cluster level. Then, optimal points are considered by Hopefield Neural Network 
(HNN) in third phase. In addition, the mobile sink is implemented based on the hierarchical algorithm 
for routing direction in WSN. The direction of the sink movement is determined according to drT
deadline at each point with the radius of transmission of CH. drT time has a significant (noticeable) effect 
on the HNN design. Also, in fourth phase, the authentication of the sent data is done by CH to the mobile 
sink. In fixed sink sensor networks, the nodes which are near the sink act as an interface to send data of 
other nodes to the sink. This causes energy consumption of nodes reduces. The energy consumption 
decreases greatly by applying mobile sink in the network because the sink is able to move between 
sensor nodes. The DoSA scenario is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1 WSNs with DoSA attack.  
 
    The presented work is structured as the following.  Section 2, deals with an overview of basic ideas. 
In Section 3 the related works are provided on the methods defensive of the system versus denial of 
sleep attack. Section 4 provides our suggested WSN-FAHN technique details. The parameters used for 
assessing the performance are studied and simulation outcomes are deliberated in Section 5. Ultimately, 
the work is concluded in Section 6. 
 
 
2 Overview of basic concepts 
Here, some basic issues are briefly provided including the Firefly algorithm and RSA algorithm. 
 
2.1 RSA Algorithm 
Data aggregation simultaneous and end-to-end confidentiality are provided by employing encryption 
in terms of privacy homomorphic. Two examples of privacy homomorphism are known as 
multiplicative PH and additive PH [8]. Additional processes on encoded information are provided by 
an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm with no requiring decrypting any separate data. 
Indeed, the operation costs for increasable PH is less than multiplicative PH, therefore, using in 
wireless sensor networks is more appropriate [8]. 
In addition, multiplicative procedures are supported by a multiplicative homomorphic over encoded 
data with no decrypting the singular information. . ( * ) ( )* ( ).ieT a b T a T b=  There are two classes of 
privacy homomorphic supporting cryptographic algorithms such as Asymmetric PH/public key 
encryption and symmetric PHs [8].In the following section, the RSA cryptography is described: 
  
2.1.1 key production of RSA 
 
 
2.1.2 Encryption 
The pseudo-code for encryption key is shown in Algorithm (2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Decryption 
The pseudo-code shown in Algorithm (3) is the decryption key. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Firefly Algorithm 
Firefly Algorithm (FA) is a multi-modal optimizing algorithm related to the nature-stimulated field. 
It is inspired by the performance of lightning bugs or fireflies [9]. FA was initially provided by Xin-
She at Cambridge University, 2007. FA is experimentally demonstrated to challenge the difficulties 
more naturally and possesses the potential to over-perform other metaheuristic algorithms. FA is 
based on 3 basic rules. According to the first, all fireflies are connected to each other with disrespect 
to gender. In the second rule, it is emphasized that attractiveness is related to the light emission or 
brightness so that less bright are attracted by bright flies, and the movement is random for the 
nonexistence of brighter flies. The last main rule indicates that the light emission of the fly is 
Algorithm 1:  Pseudo-code for RSA key production 
1: Initialization: Let m denote the “modulus” 
2: Initialization: Let en denote the “encryption exponent” 
3: Initialization: Let de denote “decryption exponent” 
4: Procedure key production 
5: Step 1: 1prim  and 2prim , denote two large random of an approximately equal size such that their product 1* 2m prim prim=  is of the 
required bit length. 
6: Step 2: Compute ( ) ( )( )1* 2   = 1 1 2 1m prim prim and prim prim=  − −   
7: Step 3: Select an integer number ,1 ,en en    thus ( )gcd , 1en  =   
8: Step 4: Compute the secret exponent ,1 ,de de     thus 1moded     
9: Step 5: ( ),m en are public key and ( ), 1, 2de prim prim  are private key. Hold all the values ( ), 1, 2de prim prim and  secrets. 
10: End Procedure 
Algorithm 2:  Pseudocode for RSA encryption key 
1: Initialization: Sender A does the following: 
2: Procedure Encryption 
3: Step1:  Create the recipient 'B s public key ( ),m en  . 
4: Step2:  Demonstrate the plaintext message as a positive integer m with 1 m en    
5: Step3:  Calculates the ciphertext 1 modenF m en=   
6: Step4:  Forwards the ciphertext F  to R   
7: End Procedure 
Algorithm 3:  Pseudo-code for RSA decryption key 
1: Initialization: Receiver B does the following: 
2: Procedure Decryption 
3: Step1: ( ),m de private key is used to compute 1 moddm c m=  
4: Step2: 1m  is representative the plaintext from the message 
13: End Procedure 
determined or affected by the objective function landscape so that the objective function is 
proportionate to the brightness [9]. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The attractiveness among the flies in FA includes two main matters including attractiveness modeling 
and the different light strengths. Brightness I is formulated as ( ) ( )I X f x  for a particular firefly at 
location X. However, attractiveness   is proportionate to the flies and is associated with the distance 
,i jR  between fireflies i and j . Eq. (1) represents the reverse square of light strength ( )I r  where 0I  
shows the intensity of the light at the source. 
 
( )
2
0
rI r I e −=   (1) 
Supposing an environment absorption coefficient  , the intensity is provided in Eq. (2) where 0I  
represents the original intensity. 
( ) 0 21
I
I r
r
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(2) 
 
In general, the Euclidean distance is exemplified in Eq. (3), representing the distance between a firefly 
at the position iX  and another one at a position jX  where ,i kX  implies the 
thk  component of the 
spatial coordinate iX . 
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A firefly I was attracted to a brighter one j as shown in Eq. (4), in which the attraction is provided by 
( )2rij j ie x x −  and 
1
2
rand
 
− 
 
 implies the randomness based on the randomizing parameter  . 
Algorithm 4:  Firefly optimization pseudo-code. 
Target function ( )f x     
    ( )1 2 3, , ,...,i dx x x x x T=   
     Produce primary population ( )1,2,...,ix i n= =   
     Let 
iI  denote light intensity at ix  is specified by ( )if x   
     Let  denote light absorption coefficient  
     while (t < Max Generation) do 
        For 1:     i n all n=  fireflies do 
            For 1:    j i all n=  fireflies do 
                If ( j iI I  ) then 
                    Move firefly i towards j in d-dimension; 
                End If 
               Attractiveness varies with distance r  via  exp r   
               Evaluate new approaches and update light intensity 
            End For 
        End For 
        Grade the fireflies and find the current best 
     End while 
Post-process results and visualization 
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Additionally, differences in attractiveness are defined by γ affecting the convergence speed and 
behavior of FA [9]. 
 
3 Related works 
Several works were developed employing various safety measurements to state DOSA and safe WSNs 
from DoSA. It is not a new problem and it was formerly investigated widely. Different methods were 
provided by investigators to cope with such attacks. 
    This study runs the impact of service attack denial resulting in the sleep attack denial in wireless 
sensor networks utilizing support vector machine learning. A model is established and examined to 
obtain better results using several kernel functions (sigmoidal, redial, and linear functions). Final results 
were concluded followed by the severe implementation. Based on the obtained consequences and 
validating the model, it is concluded that the outstanding throughput is performed by the established 
system to detect sleep strike attack denial in WSN [10]. 
    A mathematical model is established in [11], to distinguish DoSA attack in WSNs, in terms of 
absorption of Markov chain, in which, the sensor nodes were found utilizing the Markov chain model. 
Utilizing this model, attacks are recognized by taking into account the death anticipated time in sensor 
networks with a usual setup. 
    In [12], for detecting DoS attack in WSNs, a distributed cooperation-oriented hierarchical framework 
is used. Within this method, an effective heterogeneous WSN is provided with reliable behavior by 
finding anomalies in two phases, for minimizing the probability of inappropriate intrusions. For 
decreasing the attack risk, the networks are isolated in this work from malicious nodes to reject getting 
fake packets. 
    In [13], researchers review the denial of service attacks affecting resource accessibility in WSN and 
their countermeasure by providing a taxonomy. 
    In heterogeneous wireless sensor networks, a compact hierarchical model specified in [14] is utilized 
to find sleepless nodes influenced by the attack. In this technique, a cluster on the basis of operative 
energy is utilized for creating a five-layer hierarchical network to increment its longevity and 
scalability. In this study, the sensor networks are sectioned into clusters, it is possible to divide them 
into distinct sections as well. In this method, energy efficiency was attained by the minimisation of the 
number of active sensors. Furthermore, the sensor nodes are protected by the designed dynamic model 
from unexpected death. An intrusion detection system is used in this model via power analysis 
accountable for finding the tasks. Anomaly detecting technique is used in the methods for avoiding 
intrusion discovery. 
In this study, the security threats and vulnerabilities are examined that are forced by the WSNs’ 
distinctive open nature. It summarizes the necessities in WSNs including both the security and 
survivability issues. Then, a complete survey of different routing and middleware challenges is 
provided for wireless networks. Then, the potential security threats are detected in the paper at various 
protocol layers. Here, different security attacks are recognized along with their countermeasures 
assessed by various investigators recently [15]. 
    The swarm-based defensive method provided in [16] deals with sleep attacks denial using the 
anomaly detecting model for the determination of the traffic effect within sensor nodes. Therefore, the 
frequency oscillation technique was established. To gather communication and oscillation frequency, 
ant factors are utilized as swarm data. The faulty channel is found based on the oscillation frequency; 
and by isolating the node, the data are obtained, and the damaged channel is eliminated. 
In [17], there are two key contributions. First, inspired by the numerous advantages of CSL over 
ContikiMAC, we trace the present denial-of-sleep defensives for ContikiMAC to CSL. Second, in our 
work, various security improvement is suggested to these present denial-of-sleep defenses. 
Operationally, in our work, denial-of-sleep defenses for CSL alleviate well the denial-of-sleep attacks 
considerably, they also protect against numerous denial-of-sleep attacks compared to the present denial-
of-sleep defenses for ContikiMAC. We indicate the accuracy of our denial-of-sleep defenses for CSL 
analytically and empirically utilizing a whole novel CSL implementing. 
    In [18], the malicious node is detected in the intrusion detecting system in an isolation table in terms 
of the attack performance. Abnormal node is found by observing the uncommon performance. The 
sensor node performance is compared versus the attack performance to cope with irregular data. For 
the abnormal node performance, it is registered and separated in the isolating table. In Isolation Table 
Intrusion Detection System (ITIDS), sensor nodes are in charge of observing each other and finding 
sleep attack denial. 
To decrease data flooding and prevent DoS attacks, the storm control mechanism explained in [19] is 
used. The system traces the received packets frequency, and by exceeding the projected frequency 
configurating, the node changes the base position and shuts down its wireless receiver for a pre-
determined time course. 
    A two-tier system is offered in [20] in terms of a secure transmission method. In the suggested 
outline, dynamic session keys are generated using a hash-chain for symmetric encrypting key and doing 
mutual authentication. This structure needs only some fast and simple calculations in dynamic session 
key for hash functions, like SHA-1 or MD5. Considering that this outline is unified with the MAC 
protocol, there are no extra packets compared to the current MAC plans. The appropriate counter 
measurements are indicated the security analysis versus forge attack and replay attack. Moreover, 
efficient energy use is demonstrated by analyzing the energy. Furthermore, a potentially novel decision 
rule is revealed by the detailed energy distribution analysis to cooperate with the security scheme trade-
off and energy conservation. 
WSN is explained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as “a network 
consisting of the numerous sensors known as wireless sensors organized in the environment and 
geographical area”. A system consisting of sensors and actuators is known as a sensor network such as 
some of the calculating elements. WSN includes the sensors nodes sensing the surroundings' physical 
amounts. Recently, a wireless sensor network has become popular for both civil jobs and the military. 
Security is one of the most difficult tasks for WSN that is unprotected in an open situation. The 
cryptographic method is not very proper for protecting the sensor networks from outside attacks [21]. 
    In [22], two enhancements were proposed to Contiki MAC. Dozing enhancement decreases the 
energy use considerably under ding-dong ditching. In addition, the dozing enhancement aids over 
normal operation since it decreases the energy use of true wake-ups as well. On the other hand, the 
secure phase-lock enhancement is a type of Contiki MAC’s phase-lock optimizing resisting pulse-delay 
attacks. Moreover, the secure phase-lock optimizing makes ContikiMAC strong against collision 
attacks, and further energy effective. 
    In [23], denial of sleep attack detection (GA-DoSLD) algorithm was suggested by Gunasekaran et 
al. in terms of an efficient Genetic Algorithm (GA) outline for analyzing the abnormal behavior of the 
nodes. A Modified-RSA (MRSA) algorithm is run in their algorithm in the base station (BS) for 
generating and distributing key pairs among the sensor nodes. Before conveying the packets, an 
optimum route is defined based on the AODV protocol in the sensor nodes. After the determination of 
the optimum route, the relay node’s trustworthiness is guaranteed to utilize fitness computing. 
    Keerthana and Padmavathi [24] proposed an (EPSO Enhanced Particle Swarm Optimization) method 
for finding the sinkhole attacks in WSN. In comparison with the present PSO and ACO algorithms, the 
optimal message drop, packet delivery ratio, false alarm rate, and average delay were provided by the 
proposed algorithm.  
In [25], an algorithm known as Sleep attack Detection Algorithm (SLDA) is suggested for detecting 
and preventing the attack’s denial in the WSNs. This proposed SLDA algorithm is accurate and 
dynamic for detection of the Sleep attack using trust value, Mobile agent, random key pre-distribution 
& random password creation. We use a password created randomly and trust value for distinguishing 
and then for confirming an attacker node and a normal node. Furthermore, this algorithm aids in 
transmitting the data in a further secured way while preventing the Denial of sleep attacks as well as 
reducing the power use. 
    In [26], a two-phase system is provided for detecting wormhole attacks and protecting the DAWA 
MANET. The suggested procedure includes two stages. Firstly, the efficient routes are chosen in the 
system through fuzzy logic; then, using an artificial immune system, the immune route is determined 
in the chosen routes. In this work, making the wormhole tunnels via out-of-band high-power channels 
leads to the identification of the efficient wormhole attacks. Though, a prerequisite deliberation exists 
in this work indicating that when the wormhole attacks influence the destination nodes, no packets are 
received that is essentially not true. 
An IDS (Intrusion Detection System) was provided in [27], to protect against the security problems 
through the human immune system (HIS). The IDSs are utilized for detecting and responding to efforts 
to cooperate with the target system. As the UASs act in the real world, the validation and testing these 
systems with various sensors are opposed to the problems. This design is stimulated by HIS. In 
mapping, insecure signals are equal to an antigen detected by antibody-based training designs and 
eliminated from the operation cycle. The fast detecting of the intrusive signals and quarantining their 
activity are amongst the key usages of the proposed design. 
 
4 The proposed WSN-FAHN approach 
In this section, we propose a DoSA-immune schema by applying the Firefly, Hopfield Neural Networks 
(HNN), and RSA optimization. The WSN-FAHN comprises of five sections, such as the Assumption 
of the WSN-FAHN Method is discussed in Sect, 4.1. Cluster formation is considered in Sect, 4.2. In 
section 4.2 describes the sending data to CHs. Section 4.4 describes determine the movement of sink 
points. Data authentication by the mobile sink is discussed in Sect. 4.5. 
 
The Flowchart of the WSN-FAHN is shown in Fig. 2. 
 Fig. 2 WSN-FAHN flowchart. 
 
4.1 Assumption of the WSN-FAHN Method 
The WSN in the proposed WSN-FAHN consists of nodes distributed randomly. We bring up the 
following characteristics for our WSN-FAHN. The network has a multi-channel mobile sink and n 
sensor nodes which have primary energy oE . The communication of cluster members with CH is done 
in one hop. Moreover, each CH communicates with the sink in one hop. Nodes are able to adjust their 
transmission radius. Also, the network activity cycle is divided into several rounds. roundT  is the time 
spends in each rounds and it is calculated by Eq. (5). 
 
( )round cf dc drT T T T= + +   (5) 
 
cfT  is the time needed to form cluster. dcT  is the time of sending data of member cluster to CH node. 
drT  is the time needed to send data of CH node to the mobile sink. The proposed method has four 
phases as: cluster formation phase, sending data to CH, Determine the movement of sink points, and 
data authentication by the mobile sink. 
 
 
4.2 Cluster formation 
The sink aggregates the percentage of required clusters and information of all sensor nodes for the 
entire broadcast network. After receiving information from the sink, all nodes produce a random 
number between zero to one and compare it to ( )T n  value that is calculated according to Eq. (6) [28]. 
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If the produced number is less than its value, that node is chosen as the CH node in the current step. 
The selected headers compute their intensity by the target function according to Eq. (7) [28] and send 
it to other common nodes as a message form. Then, all CH nodes keep the maximum intensity value 
which are calculated by common nodes for current step. 
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( )21
o
i
I
I x
S
 
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The smaller the distance among two nodes, the greater the intensity quantity. It means that intensity 
value has an inverse relationship with its distance. oI  is the initial value of intensity in each node. iS  
value is computed by Eq. (8). 
 
( ) ( )( )0.5i i j iS S S S round = + − + −   (8) 
 
In Eq. (8), iS  is the location of CH sensor and jS  is the location of common sensors. Also, common 
nodes calculate their intensity value by Eq. (7). Also, they keep the maximum intensity values that are 
related to CH nodes. Then, common nodes compere their intensity values to received intensity value 
from CH nodes and connect to CH node which has the maximum intensity value.       
 
 
4.3 Sending data to cluster heads 
In this phase, information is gathered from the environment by common sensor nodes and they are 
sent to CH node. 
Authentication at cluster level: The sleep cycle of the sensors is arranged by using S-MAC protocol 
in sensor networks. S-MAC protocols work by sending synchronize signals to set the sleep cycle of 
the nodes. These protocols work with using control messages such as Request Forwarding (RTS) and 
Ready to Sending (CTS) that are known as synchronization packets. Repeating control packets as 
RTS message is one of the effective ways to prevent sleep deprivation attack. This causes that nodes 
do not fall to sleep. Therefore, their power loses. When these messages are sent over a short period 
of time, network nodes will not have an enough opportunity to go to sleep mode and come back again. 
This leads to lose battery power. This lose can occur for all nodes at attacker ‘s transmission time. 
Attackers send synchronization messages that means how much time a node can stay at sleep mode. 
Our proposed method is used authentication at two levels. One level is applied by CHs to examine 
member nodes of the clusters and other level is applied by the mobile sink. Also, in the first step, we 
define a threshold parameter for synchronization packets. During the normal operation, if 
synchronization value is lower than threshold value, synchronization is not used authentication. When 
the synchronization is higher than threshold quantity, sleep deprivation attack is likely happen. Thus, 
synchronization should be applied for authentication. In addition, synchronization packets are 
authenticated to synchronize when S-MAC algorithm is running. Synchronization packet must insert 
its ID in the first field before time sleep begin. When CH nodes receive a packet, they investigate 
whether the sender of the packet exists in its cluster. If the sender does not exist in its cluster, 
synchronization packet is not accepted, hence this is the first level of authentication. If the first level 
of authentication is successful, CH node which receives synchronization packet calculates arrival 
time from the node. So, each CH node maintains calculated time in its storage system. If this arrival 
time is more than the arrival time threshold, it may occur sleep deprivation attack. In this situation, 
we cannot block the suspicious node because the attack may be occurred by an external attacker that 
knows the node behavior. Its aim is to disturb network operation by sending packets with different 
IDs. In our WSN-FAHN, there is an authentication mode that is activated by CH nodes that detects 
suspicious behavior as passing the desired threshold. Each CH node sends a sync-authentication 
packet to all other nodes in its cluster to change their mode to authentication mode and forces nodes 
to send the authentication token to the next sync token. 
After authentication of node data at the cluster level, each CH creates a TDMA scheduler and sends 
it to all cluster members which have been authenticated. When TDMA is fixed in all clusters, all the 
common nodes within each cluster send their data to their specific TDMA, and each CH integrates 
them after receiving all the data from its members then send to the mobile sink. Each CH is able to 
store data in its buffer until the sink stops in suitable area near its neighbor. 
 
 
4.4 Determine the movement of sink points 
In this phase, Hopefield Network finds some optimal points for mobile sink in the network. Hopefield 
Network has several neurons that their activation shows optimal points for mobile sink. In HNN, the 
number of neurons belong to drT value. drT is the time of CH data to the mobile sink. Figure 3 shows 
the combination of HNN and WSN. 
 
Fig. 3 Combination of HNN and WSN.  
 
 
 
 
The number of HNN rows equals to number of CH nodes in the sensor network (M) and the number 
of HNN columns equals to K*S (K is the number of stop points) and S is the time unit number that 
the sink can stop at any points. Also, T is the sink allowed time in any columns.  
 
Consider drT  time in HNN: First, drT time should be determined. In our proposed method, all CH 
nodes are able to store data in their buffers until the sink stops in a suitable area near them. In this 
method, the sink has the maximum time to gather data from CH nodes. This time is shown by maxdrT  
which is computed with Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) [28]. 
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( )dc sT d =   (10) 
 
 
iC is the number of cluster member 'i th . sd  is the rate of received data from the environment by the 
cluster members.  is the coefficient of data integration. ir is the data transfer rate based on bits per 
second in the CH 'i th and M  is the number of CH nodes. Note that it is important that sink stop time 
should not exceed more than drT  quantity. Now, we get the number of active neurons for one row or 
a CH node. When a neuron is active in X row andY  column, it means that X CH node is sending data 
to the sink at theY stop point. To send all data of a CH node, certain number of neurons is needed 
that is computed by Eq. (11) [28]. 
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After obtaining the number of active neurons in a CH, the total number of neurons (active and 
inactive) should be calculated in the entire HNN. We calculate the total number of neurons for
max
drT . 
 
Calculate all neurons for 
max
drT : Considering the maximum time for drT means that the sink can have 
one or more stop points for gathering data from each cluster nodes. Therefore, it multiplies number 
of active neron ( )onneron of CH to number of stop points of CH( )*onneron k . Also, to get all 
network neron , equation multiplies to M which is number of CH. This time is shown by
( )maxdrneron T which is computed with Eq. (12). 
 
( )max * *dr onneron T neron k m=   (12) 
 
 
 
4.5 Data authentication by the mobile sink 
CH sends data which are buffered for mobile sink after authentication at cluster level and receiving 
data from CH node. The CH sends data to mobile sink as soon as the sink stops its neighborhood. 
Then, mobile sink authenticates all data sent by CH and receives data from CH. Therefore, the overall 
process is after clustering, choosing proper CHs, and authentication at cluster level, mobile sink 
receives all data from sensor nodes as CHs and all other nodes. Then, it stores them to access them. 
The transfer of the keys from mobile sink to other nodes is a vital task because keys may be attacked. 
In order to protect keys from attacks, data is transferred by interlocking protocol that keys are 
encrypted by AES algorithm. First part is transmitted. After receiving a reply from received node, the 
second part is transmitted. If these two parts are connected each other, the key can decode in the 
receiving BS. In order to perform this transmission, nodes which are in the networks must agree with 
the key symmetric encryption method. Also, encrypted key is divided into two parts at inter locking 
protocol. We have used AES algorithm that divides cryptography into two parts. These two parts are 
performed respectively. First, the node is authenticated. If it is valid and the node is the member of 
the cluster, the second part of the key is sent. The public and private keys created with RSA algorithm 
are transferred by interlocking protocol. The nodes which send synchronization sleep messages are 
proving nodes and receiving nodes acts as evaluator. Each node has a unique private key that we 
name it F. Both proving node and evaluator node shares public key. Moreover, the mobile sink sends 
the proving encrypted key from the BS when the evaluator requests it. The mobile sink calculates 
H=F2 mod V instead of sending key directly. In the equation, F is private key and V is public key. H 
value is sent to evaluator whenever it requests it. Receiving mobile sink decodes key when it receives 
a reply from node and if data of the CH node is valid, it is accepted by the mobile sink.  
 
 
The Pseudo-code for our proposed WSN-FAHN is shown in the algorithm (5). 
  
 
5 Performance evaluation 
In following section, we show and discuss the experimental simulation results of the WSN-FAHN 
to prevent DoSA. 
 
 
5.1 Performance metrics 
In following section, we investigate the performance and effectiveness of the WSN-FAHN by a 
numerical simulation in NS-2. The results are compared with CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD 
approaches proposed in [20] and [23], respectively. The notations of the considered for WSN-
FAHN are as Table 1. 
 
 
 
Algorithm (5): Pseudo code for WSN-FAHN proposed schema 
1: Step 1. Network Clustering 
2:              Select the cluster head (CH); 
3               Produce a random number between 0 and 1 by nodes; 
4:              Compare the random number with value of Eq. (10); 
5:              If the value of random number is lower than value of T(n) Then 
6:                   Its sensor selects to CH; 
7:              Else  
8:              Repeat the steps 3 to 5 to other nodes to selecting CH; 
9: Step 2. Formation cluster 
10:           Determining the value of intensity function for selecting CH by Eq. (11); 
11:           Sending that to normal nodes; 
12:           Determining the value of intensity function for normal nodes by Eq. (12); 
13:           Calculating Eq. (12) to getting the location of CH nodes and normal nodes; 
14:           Compare the value of intensity function of CH nodes with the value of intensity function for normal nodes; 
15:           Normal nodes connecting to clusters head with high value of intensity function; 
16:           Sending a connection request to CH; 
17:           Formation cluster; 
18: Step 3. Sending data to cluster node 
19:           Node Authentication at cluster level; 
20:           Calculate Threshold; 
21:           Calculate Interval; 
22:           While Interval > Threshold do 
23:                For All of the node at cluster level 
24:                      The node is invalid (attacker node); 
25:                           For All of the node at cluster level 
26:                                   Should be done Authentication Phase; 
27:                           End For 
28:                End For 
29:                                   Node is Accepted 
30:           End while 
31: Step 4. Finding the optimal points for the mobile sink; 
32:           Finding maximum point to stop sink for each CH to collect data from each CH by Eq. (13) & Eq. (14); 
33:           Calculate the number of active neurons for each CH to finding the optimal points to moving the sink from Eq. (16); 
34:           Sending data from CH to mobile sink by giving results from Lines 32, 33; 
35: Step 5. Authentication by mobile sink; 
36:           RSA key production by mobile sink; 
37:           Key distribution using by the interlock protocol; 
38:           Node authentication is done using by node reply; 
39:           If the node is invalid Then 
40:               The node is rejected. 
41:               Else 
42:               The node is Accepted 
43:           End If 
 
Table 1 Notations description Parameters Description 
 T   Network throughput 
 PDR   Packet Delivery Rate 
 DR   Detection rate 
 RE   Let RE denote the “Residual energy" 
 NL   Let RE denote the “Network lifetime" 
 
iX   Let iX  denote the “received packets by node i ”  
 
iY   Let iY denote the “sent packets by node i “ 
 
SP   Let SP denote the “Packet size" 
 
PS  Let pS denote the “Simulation stop time" 
 
TS  Let TS denote the “Simulation start time" 
 
 
5.1.1 T 
Eq. (13) show the T for n experiments , and is calculated in Kbps [29]. This metric is obtained via 
dividing the amount of packet received in the destination by the packet arrival time.  
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5.1.2 PDR 
The average ratio of the number of successfully received data packets to the number of data packets 
sent. The PDR obtained for n  experiments is shown by Eq. (14) [30-34]. 
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5.1.3 NL 
Prolong the lifetime of the network is the main goal of WSNs. And this by reducing the energy 
consumption of the sensor nodes is possible According to the explanation, the NL is the passed time 
between of communication and sensing commencement with the receiver, and the time in which the 
final communication link from active sensor to the receiver is broken. Eq. (15) denote the calculation 
of the WSN lifetime. 
1
m
i
i
NL LCH
=
=                        Where                          iLCH is the lifetime of 𝑖th CH . 
 
(15) 
 
 
5.1.4 RE 
When transmitter sensor nodes transmit information and when receiving sensor nodes receive 
information, energy is consumed. The total remaining energy in a sensor node can be measured via 
Eq. (16) based on the transmission and reception times. The parameters used for the RE are listed in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 RE parameters Parameters Description 
0di   Let 0di denote “reference distance greater than the Fraunhofer-distance” 
 di   Let di denote “the distance on which the packet is sent” 
 Lb   Let Lb denote “the number of bits per packet” 
 2di   Let 
2di denote “power loss of free space channel model” 
 4di   Let 
4di denote “power loss of multi-path fading channel model” 
 
elecE   Let elecE denote “amount of energy getting dissipated during sent or receive” 
 lb fsi   Let lb fsi denote the “transmission efficiency” 
 lb mpi   Let lb mpi denote the “condition of the channel” 
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Energy consumed [35] are calculated using Eq. (17), and Eq. (18), respectively. 
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5.1.5 DR 
 It is determined as the ratio of the number of DoSA sensors marked to the total number of existing 
DoSA sensors in the WSN. DR is calculated by Eq. (19). Table 3 show the parameters for DR. 
 
 
Table 3 DR parameters Parameters Description 
( )True Positive TP   The TP is calculated by the total number of marked the 
DoSA sensors divided by the total number of the DoSA 
sensors. 
 ( )False Positive FP   The FP is calculated by the total number of sensors 
wrongly detected as the DoSA sensors divided by the 
total number of normal sensors. 
 ( )True Negative TN   The rate of the DoSA sensor that were correctly 
marked as a DoSA sensor. 
 ( )False Negative FN   The rate of the DoSA sensor to total normal sensors 
that were mistakenly marked as a normal sensor. 
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 5.2 Simulation Setup and Comparing Algorithms 
The basic advantage of simulation is shortening analysis, largely in large-scale networks [36, 37]. All 
simulations were performed using Network Simulator2 (NS-2) tools.  
 
 
 
5.3 Simulation results 
We have simulated WSN-FAHN schema in the NS-2 on Linux Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The parameters 
used in WSN-FAHN simulation is given in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4 Parameters used in WSN-FAHN 
simulation. 
Parameters Value 
Topology 290  90 x m  
 Sensor nodes 300   
 Range of transmission  150 250 m−   
 Size of packets 512 Bytes   
 
elecE  100 /nJ bit  
 
fsi  
220 / /pJ bit m  
 
mpi  
4.0015 / /pJ bit m  
 Energy 45 J   
 Idle power 51 mW   
 Receiving power 55 mW   
 Sleep power 35 W   
 Power of transmission  51 mW   
 Sensing power of sensors 88*10 J−  
 Simulation time 70 s  
 
 
 
 
 
The performance of WSN-FAHN with that of CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD in terms of DR , T , PDR
, residualEnergy , NL  are shown in Table 5-9. 
 
Table 5 DR vs misbehaving sensor 
ratio. 
Misbehaving sensor ratio DR  (%) 
 CrossLayer   GA DoSLD−   ASDA   
 0 100 100 100 
 0.05 85 95 98 
 0.15 80 91 97 
 0.25 75 85 96 
 0.35 72 81 95 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 T vs misbehaving sensor 
ratio. 
Misbehaving sensor ratio T  (in kbps) 
 CrossLayer   GA DoSLD−   ASDA   
 0 900.85 900.85 900.85 
 0.05 750.8 700.4 870.5 
 0.15 580.7 610.9 835.4 
 0.25 550.7 580.4 800.2 
 0.35 420.03 490.3 780.9 
 
 
 
Table 7 PDR vs misbehaving 
sensor ratio. 
Misbehaving sensor ratio PDR  (in %) 
 CrossLayer   GA DoSLD−   ASDA   
 0 100 100 100 
 0.05 
82 92 94 
 0.15 
71 85 91 
 0.25 
65 81 89 
 0.35 60 78 88 
 
 
Table 8 
residualEnergy  vs 
misbehaving sensor ratio. 
Misbehaving sensor ratio 
residualEnergy  (in %) 
 CrossLayer   GA DoSLD−   ASDA   
 0 100 100 100 
 0.05 75.8 81.7 95.7 
 0.15 71.8 78.4 91.4 
 0.25 67.8 74.2 87.4 
 0.35 65.8 71.08 82.8 
 
 
 
Table 9 NL  vs misbehaving 
sensor ratio. 
Misbehaving sensor ratio NL  (in sec) 
 CrossLayer   GA DoSLD−   ASDA   
 0 1000 1000 1000 
 0.05 690 878 954 
 0.15 
610 790 904 
 0.25 500 710 897 
 0.35 
450 650 887 
 
The average values of all methods under DoSA is given in Table 10. 
Table 10 Average values. 
Schemes   Throughput  PDR   Detection rate   Residual energy  Lifetime  
 
 
 
GA DoSLD−  
 
Number of sensor nodes   542.416  76.4   81.55   81   617.2   
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   640.616   75.6   82.4   76.24   650   
Simulation times   417.8571429   77.71428571   76.71428571   80.3   28.41666667   
Attack interval   284.0525   66.75   70.875   72.125   618.75   
 
 
CrossLayer  
Number of sensor nodes   612.588  89.4   85.928   85.774   650   
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   656.57   87.2   90.4   81.076   805.6   
Simulation times   557.2857143   81.85714286   84.57142857   84.81428571   30.01428571   
Attack interval   364.9825   82.875   76.5   76.1225   642.625   
 
 
ASDA  
Number of sensor nodes   722.686   94.4   92.09   93.08   875   
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   837.57   92.4   97.2   91.46   928.4   
Simulation times   827.14286   90.285714   92.142857   93.185714   37.23   
Attack interval   602.75   89   94.25   86.785   854.375   
 
Figure 4 presents the average throughput of sensors participating in data sending/receiving operations 
in WSN-FAHN, GA-DosLD, and CrossLayer methods based on network topology. The results obtained 
from simulations indicate that in the WSN-FAHN method, since the CH sends its data to the sink only 
when the sink stops at an appropriate location in its vicinity, it leads to decreased energy consumption 
in the sensors and reduced data transmission time. Also, throughput of the WSN-FAHN increases 
compared to GA-DosLD and CrossLayer methods. 
  
 
Fig. 4 Comparison of the WSN-FAHN, CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD models in term of Throughput. 
Figure 5 presents the PDR of sensors participating in the sending/receiving operations in the proposed 
and other methods. Results obtained from simulation show that the packet reception rate in the 
proposed WSN-FAHN method is higher because, due to mobility of the sink, cluster head data reach 
the sink in the least amount of time possible. This leads to lower lost data and transmission of data 
time to the sink and higher data reception rates in the proposed method compare to GA-DosLD and 
CrossLayer methods. Also, to supply some description on these results, it is worth mentioning that 
when the power is properly adjusted, our proposed scheme requires less power to send packets. Plus, 
in each CH iteration selection, the node residual energy and its distance to the receiver criterion is 
considered, and the node with the highest level of energy is chosen as the CH. This will control the 
energy available in the network and increase the remaining energy, resulting in a better performance. 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Comparison of the WSN-FAHN, CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD models in term of PDR. 
Comparing DR in the proposed WSN-FAHN method with GA-DosLD and CrosLayer methods, 
according to Figure 6, shows that the detection rate is higher in the proposed method compared to 
GA-DosLD and CrossLayer methods. Since in the proposed method, an authentication step is carried 
out by CH for all sensors first and then, due to the decreased distance of sending data to the sink by 
the CH, packets reach the sink faster and node energies do not decrease. This makes the sink carry 
out the second authentication faster and with higher detection rate. 
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Fig. 6 Comparison of the WSN-FAHN, CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD models in term of Detection rate. 
Figure 7 presents the residual energy values of WSN-FAHN and other methods for different values. 
The results show that residual energy in the WSN-FAHN method does not deplete rapidly due to the 
mobility of sink and low data transmission distance. This leads to higher residual energy compared 
to other methods like GA-DosLD and CrossLayer where sink is stationary and long distances must 
be passed to transmit cluster head data to sink. As demonstrated in the Fig. 6, WSN-FAHN decreases 
the RE by more than 20 and 12% those of GA-DoSLD and CrossLayer, respectively. 
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Fig. 7 Comparison of the WSN-FAHN, CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD models in term of Residual energy. 
 
Figure 8 presents the lifetime comparison of the proposed method with existing GA-DosLD and 
CrossLayer clustering techniques. The results extracted from simulations indicate that sink mobility 
in the proposed WSN-FAHN method leads to reduced data transmission distance from cluster head 
to sink and therefore lower energy consumption in the sensors. This makes network lifetime longer 
compared to GA-DosLD and CrossLayer methods which have stationary sinks. 
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Fig. 8 Comparison of the WSN-FAHN, CrossLayer and GA-DoSLD models in term of Lifetime. 
Figure 9, show the comparison between WSN-FAHN, RSA (128), WSN-FAHN, RSA (256), 
WSN-FAHN, RSA (512), WSN-FAHN, RSA (768), WSN-FAHN, RSA (1024), WSN-FAHN, 
RSA (1280) cryptography algorithms. The encryption and decryption times increase in all methods 
with the increase in key size and chunk size. By increasing key size, we get better security in all 
methods but speed decreases in the meanwhile. In comparison, WSN-FAHN with key size 512, 
encryption time is 254 ms and decryption time is 789 ms with block size 1024. Also, for WSN-
FAHN with key size 1024, encryption time is 324 ms while decryption time is 1280 ms with block 
size 1024.  Therefore, WSN-FAHN performs well compared to other encryption and decryption 
methods in terms of encryption and decryption. Also, WSN-FAHN has significantly improved 
security. In addition, in the RSA algorithm, the longer key length is, more time will be spent on 
key encryption and decryption by the nodes. This will in turn lead to more energy consumption in 
the nodes.  
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
 Fig. 9 Encryption and Decryption time vs different chunk size in WSN-FAHN 
The comparison results of the WSN-FAHN, in terms of consumption energy at different type of data size 
and different chunk Size are provided in Figure 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10 Consumption energy vs different chunk size in WSN-FAHN 
 
6 Conclusion and Future work 
In this paper, a hybrid approach is proposed based on mobile sink, firefly algorithm based on leach, and 
HNN. Thus, mobile sink is applied to both improve energy consumption and increase network lifetime. 
Firefly algorithm is proposed to cluster nodes and authenticate in two levels to prevent from DoSA. In 
addition, HNN detects the direction route of the sink movement to send data of CH. The proposed 
solution effectively prevents DoSL attacks, since all the nodes that transmit synchronisation messages 
should be validated, if not, before the messages are accepted. If the nodes are not validated, the messages 
will be rejected. The attacker node is unable to replay the sleep synchronisation signal, since the sleep 
schedule cannot be accepted without authentication, and sensor nodes possess limited resources and 
capabilities. Employing the authentication method proposed here extends the network lifetime, through 
effective battery consumption while maintaining a secure communication within the network. The 
results confirmed that our WSN-FAHN scheme is capable of exhibiting high-levels of security and high 
ratio of detection (exceeding 93.92%). It addition, our proposed scheme has high PDR (more than 
91.52%), high throughput (more than 90.75%), high Average Residual energy (more than 91.125%), 
and high network lifetime (more than 89.95%), in comparison with the other approaches currently being 
employed. In future work, the use of several mobile sinks is suggested to further reduce energy 
consumption in wireless sensor networks. 
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